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ABSTRACT
A passenger who seeks to recover for bodily injury incurred as a
consequence of the inherent risks of international air transportation is
limited to the uniform and exclusive cause of action provided under
Article 17 of the Warsaw and Montreal conventions. However, courts
have been inconsistent in their decisions as to whether the passenger
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should be allowed to recover damages for purely emotional distress
resulting from aircraft accidents. Three approaches have been developed
to resolve this issue: (1) disallow recovery for pure emotional distress;
(2) allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a bodily
injury; and (3) allow recovery for all emotional distress so long as bodily
injury occurs.
The purpose of this Article is to examine these three approaches in
light of common law cases.
INTRODUCTION
In international air travel, the Warsaw Convention of 1929 1 and the
Montreal Convention of 1999 2 are the main instruments applicable to
cases of liability of a carrier to redress passenger injury.3 Article 17 in both
conventions sets forth the conditions under which an international air

Copyright 2022, by ABDULLA HASSAN MOHAMED.
* College of Law, UAE University.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]. The Convention had two objectives. First, it was intended to
establish uniform rules governing parties to international air carriage contracts.
Second, it was intended to limit the liability of air carriers in exchange for limiting
the defenses available to such carriers. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247, 256, 259 (1984).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-45 (1999) [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]. The Montreal Convention has the stated purpose of providing a
modernized uniform liability regime for international air transportation.
3. Article 29 of Montreal Convention provides that:
In the carriage of passengers, . . . any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits
of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the
question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary
or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 29. See El Al Israel Airline v.
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 155 (1999) (where the U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that a passenger is precluded from maintaining an action for personal injury
damage under local law when the claim does not satisfy the conditions for
liability under Article 17 of Warsaw Convention).
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carrier can be held liable for passenger death or bodily injury. 4 Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention reads: 5
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking. 6
This article has remained more or less unmodified over the years, and the
Montreal Convention made only inconsequential changes to the language
of Article 17. 7 Article 17 of the Montreal Convention reads:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking. 8
An air carrier will be liable for the passengers’ injuries, irrespective of
whether the Warsaw Convention or Montreal Convention applies, only
when the following three conditions are satisfied: 9 (1) there has been an
accident that has been defined as “an unusual or unexpected event or
happening external to the passenger,” (2) the passenger suffered bodily
injury as a result of the accident, and (3) the accident took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of operations of embarking or disembarking. 10

4. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
5. The authentic French text of Article 17 of The Warsaw Convention reads
as follows:
Le transporteur est responsible du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre lésion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l’accident qui a causé le dommage s’est produit a bord de l’aéronef ou
au cours de toutes opérations d’embarquement et de débarquement.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17.
6. Id. at art. 17; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Accidents & Injuries in
International Air Law: The Clash of the Titans, 24 KOREAN J. AIR & SPACE L. &
POL’Y 236, 237 (2009); GEORGE TOMPKINS, LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM WARSAW 1929 TO MONTREAL 1999, at 124 (2010).
7. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
8. Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17.
9. E. Airlines, 499 U.S. 530.
10. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 392 (1985)
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A compensable bodily injury requires some proof of physical damage
to the body of the passenger, 11 such as a broken arm, a broken leg, or a
burn. 12 The major question that has troubled common law courts for years
is whether Article 17 encompasses a claim for emotional distress, such as
fear, fright, anxiety, or nervousness, 13 because this question was never
discussed during the drafting of the Warsaw Convention or in the
Convention’s early years. 14
It was the mid-1970s before claims were brought for emotional
distress; these claims arose out of a number of terrorist hijackings. 15
11. E. Airlines, 499 U.S. at 530.
12. TOMPKINS, supra note 6, at 135.
13. A number of the delegates to the Montreal Conference suggested that
stand alone “mental injury”—such as fear, fright, nervousness, anguish, anxiety,
stress—should be included as a “compensable” injury in Article 17 of the
Montreal Convention. The Delegate Observers of the International Air Trans-Port
Association (IATA) were strongly opposed to this suggestion, due to problems of
proof or disproof of such subjective claims, and eventually, after lengthy and
intense debate, “stand alone mental injury” was not included expressly as a
compensable injury in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. See Excerpt from
Warsaw Convention Conference Minutes, October 4–12, 1929, reprinted at app.
161–64.
14. Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lésion
Corporelle, 25 TEX. INT’L L.J. 127, 132 (1990). The early drafts of the Montreal
Convention’s Article 17 would have expressly included liability for mental injury.
See Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66 J.
AIR L. & COM. 21, 27 (2000). Later drafts even introduced the element of personal
injury designed to encompass both physical and mental injuries. See Ruwantissa
I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims – Emergent Trends, 65 J. AIR
L. & COM. 225, 227 (2000). For example, the provision (then Article 16) of the
first draft of the Montreal Convention corresponding to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention 29 read:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury
or mental injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely
from the state of health of the passenger.
Id. at 226–27 (emphasis added). Other drafts of the convention even included the
term “personal injury”; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO removed
both “mental injury” and “personal” injury from the provision, choosing instead
to leave the language virtually unchanged.
15. The first case decided by a supreme court of a Warsaw Convention
signatory state on the question of whether mental anguish alone can be recovered
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Passengers who had not suffered any identifiable physical injuries
nevertheless claimed compensation for the terror and mental anguish they
had experienced. 16 The litigation that followed raised the question of
whether Article 17 encompasses a claim for emotional distress.
This Article aims to review several common law cases that have
addressed the issue of recovery for emotional distress damages under
Article 17 in order to find out the current position of an air carrier’s
liability for such damages.
It is worth noting that most cases that have dealt with claims for
emotional distress under Article 17 were decided before the Montreal
Convention was adopted. However, as Article 17 of the Montreal
Convention repeats verbatim the substance of the original Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, the precedent developed under the Warsaw
Convention is still relevant, if not determinative, in cases to which the
Montreal Convention applies. 17
I. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS BEFORE FLOYD
In the United States, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in the
landmark case of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 18 the courts were split as
to whether a plaintiff could recover under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention for emotional distress that does not result from a “bodily

under Article 17 is the Israeli case Air France v. Teichner, 38(3) PD 785 (1984)
(Isr.). The case stems from the hijacking of an Air France aircraft on June 27,
1976. The hijackers forced the pilot to land at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda,
where the passengers were held for several days before they were rescued by
Israeli forces. The Supreme Court of Israel held that Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention permitted recovery for emotional distress damages. See Dafna Yoran,
Recovery for Emotional Distress Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention: The American Versus the Israeli Approach, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT’L
L. 811, 819–20 (1992).
16. Robert J. Rivers Jr., Torts – International Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 353, 357 (1990).
17. See Sompo Japan Ins. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776 (7th
Cir. 2008); Byrd v. Comair, 501 F. Supp. 2d 902 (E.D. Ky. 2007); Baah v. Virgin
Atlantic Airways, 473 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Fed.
Express Corp., 454 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Dempsey, supra, note 6, at
237; TOMPKINS, supra, note 6 at 124.
18. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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injury” or “lésion corporelle.” 19 In Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 20
and Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 21 both courts held that damages
for stand-alone mental injuries were not compensable under Article 17, 22
whereas in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 23 the court allowed
recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article 17.
In Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the plaintiffs boarded a Trans
World Airlines flight from Athens to New York. After additional
passengers boarded in Frankfurt, members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine hijacked the plane, diverted the aircraft to Jordan,
and forced it to land on a dry lakebed in the desert outskirts of Amman. 24
The plaintiffs claimed that they feared for their lives during their period of
captivity and thus experienced severe emotional trauma. 25 The plaintiffs
sued TWA for their purely emotional distress. 26
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held
that damages for mental anguish alone could not be recovered under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 27 In addition, the court examined
the legislative history of the Convention and found a strong inference that
the drafters intended to exclude recovery for purely emotional distress by
using a narrow definition of lésion corporelle. 28
The court looked to the French legal meaning of the term for
guidance. 29 The court noted that French law distinguishes sharply between
19. See generally Karen M. Campbell, The Emotional Trauma of Hijacking:
Who Pays?, 74 KY. L.J. 599, 611–20 (1985) (surveying conflicting decisions as
to whether Article 17 encompasses claims for emotional distress unaccompanied
by physical injury).
20. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
21. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
22. See Finkelstein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 434 U.S. 858 (1977) (no
recovery for purely mental injuries as a result of a hijacking and no physical
injuries).
23. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
abrogated by E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). Other courts that
have allowed recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article 17 include the
Southern District of New York in Borham v. Pan Am. World Airways, No. 856922, 1986 WL 2974 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1986) and the Central District of
California in Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
24. Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1153.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1157.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1155.
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“bodily injury” (lésion corporelle) and “mental injury” (lésion mentale)
and consequently decided that the two phrases were mutually exclusive 30
and that a mental injury is only compensable if it flows from a physical
injury:
Plaintiffs next contend that recovery may be obtained for mental
anguish suffered as a result of physical injuries according to
generally recognized principles of jurisprudence. Supporting this
contention is the language of Article 17 itself which states that the
carrier is liable “for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger . . . .” Certainly, mental anguish directly resulting from
a bodily injury is damage sustained in the event of a bodily injury.
The delegates apparently chose to follow this well recognized
principle of law allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting
from the occurrence of a bodily injury, the emotional distress
being directly precipitated by the bodily injury being considered
as a part of the bodily injury itself. Therefore, plaintiffs may
recover . . . for any such emotional anxiety that they can
demonstrate resulted from a bodily injury suffered as a
consequence of the hijacking. 31
In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the New York Court of
Appeals considered the claims of passengers involved in the hijacking of
a flight from Tel Aviv to New York.32 The claims were brought under
Article 17 for emotional injury accompanied by physical injury. 33
Guerillas armed with rifles and hand grenades hijacked the plane on
September 6, 1970, and held the plaintiffs hostage for six days. 34 The
plaintiffs claimed that they suffered “severe psychic trauma” and that they
were damaged “by the physical circumstances of their imprisonment
aboard the aircraft.” 35 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
physical injury as a result of the forced immobility, inadequate sanitary
facilities, and scarcity of food and water. 36 The alleged physical injuries
included backaches, swollen feet, boils, skin irritation, weight loss,

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1158.
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dehydration, and sleep deprivation. 37 The defendant airline argued that the
liability scheme of the Warsaw Convention did not allow recovery because
psychic injury, “with or without palpable physical manifestation,” is not
“bodily injury” within the meaning of Article 17 and “the physical injuries
claimed did not result from any impact and in any case are so slight as not
to amount to compensable ‘bodily injury.’” 38
The court began by examining the meaning of Article 17 in its original
French and found that there was no dispute that the French words lésion
corporelle were properly translated as “bodily injury” for purposes of the
plaintiffs’ claims; thus, the meaning of “bodily injury” was at issue.39 The
court acknowledged that the French legal usage of the term lésion
corporelle should be considered but declined to apply French law to
determine the meaning of the term. 40 The first step in the court’s analysis
was to determine whether “the treaty’s use of the word ‘bodily,’ in its
ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to include ‘mental.’” 41 The court
found that the ordinary meaning of “bodily injury” connotes “palpable,
conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no
observable ‘bodily,’ as distinguished from ‘behavioral,’ manifestations.” 42
Given the plain meaning of the term, the court concluded that “the
compensable injuries must be ‘bodily’ but there may be an intermediate
causal link which is the ‘mental’ between the cause—the ‘accident’—and
the effect—the ‘bodily injury.’” 43 Once the causal link is established, the
court reasoned, damages sustained as a result of the “bodily injury”—
whether mental or physical—are compensable under the Warsaw
Convention. 44 The court found that the airline was liable for the palpable,
objective bodily injuries, “including those caused by the psychic trauma
of the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries,
but not for the trauma as such or for the nonbodily or behavioral
manifestations of that trauma.” 45
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., the plaintiff, Husserl, boarded
a Swiss Air direct flight from Zurich to New York in September of 1970. 46
37. Id.
38. Id. at 852.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 853.
41. Id. at 855.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 857.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
abrogated by E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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Shortly after takeoff, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine hijacked the plane and directed the pilot to fly to a desert area
near Amman. 47 Once there, the plaintiff was forced to stay on the plane
for approximately 24 hours under circumstances “less than ideal for . . .
mental health.” 48 Once the plaintiff returned to New York, she filed suit
under the Warsaw Convention, alleging that from the time the terrorists
took control of the aircraft until she returned to Zurich she suffered “severe
mental pain and anguish resulting from her expectation of severe injury
and/or death.” 49 Swiss Air contended that the plaintiff could not recover
under the Warsaw Convention because her injuries were purely
emotional. 50
In determining whether the phrase “en cas de mort, de blessure ou de
toute autre lésion corporelle” (in the event of the death or wounding, or
any other bodily injury) comprehended mental and psychosomatic
injuries, the Southern District of New York attempted to ascertain the
intention of the drafters and signatories of the Warsaw Convention. 51 The
court was, however, unable to ascertain the specific intent of the
Convention’s framers and thus concluded “that the parties probably had
no specific intention at all about mental and psychosomatic injuries
because, if they had, they would have clearly expressed their intentions.” 52
Consequently, the court held “that the phrase ‘death or wounding . . . or
any other bodily injury,’ as used in Article 17, does comprehend mental
injuries.” 53
II. EASTERN AIRLINES V. FLOYD
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd in order to resolve the question debated among
lower courts of whether Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention allows
recovery for pure mental injuries. 54 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme
Court concluded that recovery for pure emotional injuries is not permitted
under Article 17. 55

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1248–49.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1253.
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
Id. at 534.
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The relevant facts of Floyd were as follows. On May 5, 1983, an
Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for the Bahamas. 56
Shortly after takeoff, one of the plane’s three jet engines lost oil pressure. 57
The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plane around
to return to Miami. Soon thereafter, the second and third engines also
failed due to loss of oil pressure. 58 The plane began losing altitude rapidly,
and the crew informed the passengers that the plane would be ditched in
the Atlantic Ocean. 59 Luckily, after a period of descending flight without
power, the crew managed to restart one of the engines and landed the plane
safely at Miami International Airport.60
Floyd brought an action against Eastern Airlines, claiming damages
solely for mental distress arising out of the incident. “Eastern conceded
that the engine failure and subsequent preparations for ditching the plane
amounted to an ‘accident’ under Article 17 of the [Warsaw] Convention
but argued that Article 17 also [made] physical injury a condition of
liability.” 61 The district court, relying on the Burnett court’s analysis of
the French authentic text and negotiating history of the Warsaw
Convention, 62 concluded that Floyd’s “mental anguish alone [was] not
compensable under Article 17.” 63
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the district court, holding that the phrase “‘lésion corporelle’
in the authentic French text of Article 17 encompasse[d] purely emotional
distress” 64 and granted recovery to Floyd. 65 The court based its decision
upon several factors. First, the court interpreted lésion corporelle based on
its French legal meaning. 66 Second, the court looked to subsequent actions
by the contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention that interpreted the
treaty. 67 Third, the court analyzed the prior case law interpreting Article
56. Id. at 533.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id..
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
63. E. Airlines, 499 U.S at 534.
64. Id. at 530 (citing Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
65. Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1471–72.
66. Id. at 1471–73. The court concluded that a literal translation of “bodily
injury” into its non-legal meaning would not capture its French legal meaning.
67. Id. at 1473. The court first noted that the drafters of the Convention did
not discuss recovery for emotional injuries. In particular, the court found the
textual changes made to the Convention’s provisions by the Hague Protocol,
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17. 68 Finally, the court noted that permitting recovery of damages for
mental injuries would support the underlying policy of the Convention of
establishing a uniform system of law and liability governing international
air carriers. 69
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery
for purely mental injuries.70 In order to come to its decision, the Supreme
Court first examined the French legal meaning of the term lésion
corporelle, as used in the Warsaw Convention, to determine the
expectations of all parties to the Convention. 71 Bilingual dictionaries
indicated that the proper translation of the term is “bodily injury,”
suggesting that Article 17 does not permit recovery for psychic injuries. 72
The Court then reviewed French legal materials and discovered that
the term lésion corporelle was rarely used in French law in 1929. 73 The
Court noted that no French case had construed Article 17 to cover psychic
injury and that cases in which the phrase was used invariably involved
physical injuries. 74 The term was most frequently utilized in causes of
action based on injuries incurred in automobile accidents.
The Court turned to the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention
and found that the translation of lésion corporelle as “bodily injury” is
consistent with that history. 75 From its review of the Convention’s
documentary record, the Court found no evidence that the signatories
specifically considered liability for psychic injury. 76 The Court averred
that, because a remedy for mental anguish was unknown to most
jurisdictions in 1929, the drafters would most likely have felt obliged to
make explicit reference to purely mental injury if they had specifically
intended to provide for such recovery. 77 The Court further deemed the
narrower reading of lésion corporelle to be consistent with the primary
purpose of the parties negotiating at the Convention, namely the limiting
Montreal Agreement, and Guatemala Protocol, which were later ratified by many
countries, to be convincing evidence that the term lésion corporelle should
include purely mental suffering.
68. Id. at 1475–80.
69. Id. at 1479.
70. E. Airlines, 499 U.S. at 534.
71. Id. at 536–42.
72. Id. at 536–37.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 542.
76. Id. at 544.
77. Id. at 544–45.

1154

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

of liability of air carriers in an effort to encourage the growth of the thennascent commercial aviation industry. 78 The Court emphasized that,
regardless of what the current view of the Convention signatories may be,
in 1929, the negotiating parties were more concerned with fostering a new
industry than with fully compensating injured passengers. 79 This
legislative choice directed the Court to interpret lésion corporelle
narrowly, thus excluding recovery for purely mental injury:
Indeed, the unavailability of compensation for purely psychic
injury in many common and civil law countries at the time of the
Warsaw Conference persuades us that the signatories had no
specific intent to include such a remedy in the Convention.
Because such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most,
jurisdictions in 1929, the drafters most likely would have felt
compelled to make an unequivocal reference to purely mental
injury if they had specifically intended to allow such recovery. 80
The Supreme Court then examined the post-1929 conduct and
interpretations of the signatories and found that relevant evidence supports
the narrow translation of lésion corporelle. 81 First, in 1951, a committee
composed of 20 Convention signatories convened in Madrid and adopted
a proposal to substitute the phrase “affection corporelle” for “lésion
corporelle” in Article 17. 82 The intent of the French delegate who
proposed the change of language was to expand the coverage of the phrase
to include injuries such as mental illness, due to fear that the word “lésion”
was too narrow and “presupposed a rupture in the tissue.” 83 The United
States delegate opposed the change, desiring to exclude recovery for
disturbances neither connected with nor occurring as the result of bodily
injury, but the committee nonetheless adopted the proposal. 84 Although
the amendment was never implemented, the Court found that the
discussion and subsequent vote showed the view of the signatories that
lésion corporelle has a “distinctly physical scope.” 85
In concluding that air carriers cannot be held liable under Article 17
for an accident that has not caused a passenger to suffer physical injury,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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physical manifestation of injury, or death, the Court avoided expressing a
view as to whether the Warsaw Convention allows recovery for mental
injuries accompanied by physical injuries, as the passengers in this case
did not present this issue:
[A]n air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an
accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury, or physical manifestation of injury . . . . Although
Article 17 renders air carriers liable for “damage sustained in the
event of” (“dommage survenu en cas de”) such injuries, . . . we
express no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental
injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries. That issue is
not presented here because respondents do not allege physical
injury or physical manifestation of injury. 86
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS SINCE FLOYD
The Floyd case has become the dominant precedent for purely mental
injury under the Warsaw Convention in U.S. jurisdictions since it was
decided, and it has exerted a strong persuasive influence in other common
law jurisdictions. This may not be surprising as it was perhaps the first,
albeit most conservative, attempt by a supreme court to define and discuss
the interpretive issues regarding lésion corporelle. However, the explicit
imprecision and ambivalence of the Supreme Court’s dictum in Floyd—
“we express no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental
injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries” 87—left the door open
for all sorts of litigation. 88 For example, to recover under Article 17, need
the emotional injury result from the physical harm, or may the physical
harm result from the emotional injury? In other words, may the physical
injury simply be the physical manifestation of emotional harm (e.g., if the
plaintiff was not physically touched but suffered hives, diarrhea, or hair
loss because of her fright), or must there instead be some direct physical
contact that produces a bruise, lesion, or broken bone causing emotional
harm? Also, if the accident causes emotional harm that, in turn, causes
bodily injury, may the passenger recover for the emotional harm that
precedes its physical manifestation or only the pain and suffering flowing

86. Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Jean-Paul Boulee, Recovery for Mental Injuries That Are Accompanied
by Physical Injuries Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: The Progeny of
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 501 (1995).
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subsequently from the bodily injury? If death or direct bodily injury
occurs, may the passenger recover for pre-impact injuries? 89
The courts, in answering the above questions, have adopted three
approaches:
(1) disallow recovery for pure emotional distress;
(2) allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a
bodily injury; and
(3) allow recovery for all emotional distress, so long as bodily
injury occurs.90
A. Disallow Recovery for Pure Emotional Distress
The first approach is to disallow recovery for pure emotional distress.
Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Floyd, several courts have
adopted this approach and consistently found that pure emotional distress
is not actionable under Article 17. The following are cases where the
courts adopted this first approach.
1. El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng
In Tseng, the plaintiff, Tsui Yuan Tseng, arrived at JFK Airport to
board an El Al Israel Airlines flight to Tel Aviv. 91 During the pre-boarding
procedures, an El Al security guard questioned Tseng about her
destinations and travel plans. 92 The guard considered Tseng’s responses to
be “illogical” and ranked her as a “high risk” passenger. Tseng was taken
to a private security room and was told to remove her shoes, jacket, and
sweater and to lower her blue jeans to mid-hip. 93 A female security guard
then searched Tseng’s body outside her clothes by hand and with an
electronic security wand. After the search, El Al personnel decided that
Tseng did not pose a security threat and allowed her to board the flight. 94
Tseng later testified that she was really sick and very upset during the
flight, that she was emotionally traumatized and disturbed during her trip,
and that she underwent medical and psychiatric treatment for the lingering

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Dempsey, supra note 6, at 235.
See Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 163 (1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 164.
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effects of the body search. 95 Tseng filed suit against El Al, alleging assault
and false imprisonment but no bodily injury. 96
The district court dismissed Tseng’s personal injury claim because
Tseng sustained no bodily injury as a result of the search and the Warsaw
Convention does not permit recovery for psychic or psychosomatic injury
unaccompanied by bodily injury. 97 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Tseng was not entitled to compensation under
Article 17 because she sustained no bodily injury and could not recover
for her solely psychic or psychosomatic injuries:
In sum, from the . . . authorities, we derive the following: a carrier
is liable in damages for an accident on board the aircraft or in the
course of embarking or disembarking that causes the death or
wounding or any other bodily injury of a passenger . . . . [W]e hold
that even though the event of which plaintiff complains occurred
during the course of her embarkation on defendant's airplane,
there was no accident and she suffered no bodily injury. 98
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “[t]he Convention provides
for compensation under Article 17 only when the passenger suffers ‘death,
physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury.’” 99 Both the district
court and the court of appeals determined that Tseng did not meet the
“bodily injury” requirement and could not recover under Article 17 for her
solely psychic or psychosomatic injuries. 100
2. Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Services
In Croucher, the plaintiff, Mrs. Croucher, was a passenger onboard a
Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight from New Jersey to Seoul. After the plane
departed from New Jersey, the plaintiff’s child became ill. 101 The plaintiff
removed the airsickness bag from the seatback pocket and as she opened
the bag, came into contact with fluid in the bag, which the plaintiff claimed
was left from a previous KAL flight. 102 The fluid in the airsickness bag
was tested in Korea for the presence of human immunovirus and was
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
2000).
102.

Id.
Id. at 155.
Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997).
El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 165 n.9.
Id. at 155.
Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Serv., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.N.J.
Id.
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found to be hepatitis C positive. 103 Mrs. Croucher was tested for hepatitis
C on a series of occasions thereafter with negative results. 104 Nevertheless,
Mrs. Croucher sued KAL, alleging that as a result of KAL’s negligence,
she came in contact with bio-medical waste, causing her severe emotional
distress and mental anxiety, even though there was no physical injury. 105
The district court, relying on Floyd, determined that the plaintiff’s
emotional distress and anxiety failed to constitute a “bodily injury” within
the meaning of Article 17. 106 Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of KAL:
[KAL] correctly claims that purely mental anguish does not
constitute a “bodily injury” for which damages are recoverable
under the Convention. See [Floyd] (concluding that Article 17
requirement that accident results in “bodily injury” does not
encompass claims for damages solely for mental distress).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have not suffered any “bodily
injury” and that they seek only to recover damages for emotional
distress arising out of the concern and fear over being exposed to
the potential for developing the Hepatitis C Virus or some other
infectious disease. 107
3. Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Lee, 108 following the delay and ultimate cancellation of Lee’s flight
from New York to London, Lee brought a claim under Article 19 of the
Warsaw Convention seeking compensation for damages arising out of a
flight delay and in particular, for inconvenience and loss of a “refreshing,
memorable vacation.” 109 The airline argued that the plaintiff’s
inconvenience damages were not damages for delay under Article 19 at all
but disguised claims for emotional distress that were not permitted under
Article 17. 110

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 506.
107. Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
108. Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 355 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2004).
109. Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 301-1179P, 2002 WL 1461920 (N.D. Tex.
July 2, 2002).
110. Id. at *3.
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The district court analyzed the plaintiff’s inconvenience damages and
determined that they fell under the rubric of mental injuries. 111 After recharacterizing the plaintiff’s damages as mental anguish rather than
economic in nature, the court granted the motion for summary judgment
in favor of the airline, relying on the Floyd decision. 112
On appeal, Lee contended that his claim for inconvenience and loss of
a refreshing, memorable vacation was a claim for economic damages and
not a claim for mental anguish damages.113 Specifically, Lee alleged that
American Airlines inconvenienced him by forcing him to spend time in a
terminal without adequate food, water, restroom facilities, and information
regarding the status of his flight; forcing him to spend the night in a dirty,
substandard, and unsafe motel room; and causing him to lose a full day of
vacation.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Lee’s allegations,
holding that Lee’s alleged damages were nothing more than pure mental
injuries arising “from discomfort, annoyance, and irritation” as a result of
the delay and that no economic loss had occurred. 114 As such, the court,
relying on Floyd, concluded that Lee could not recover for mental injuries
under the Warsaw Convention:
We agree with the district court that, as alleged, Lee’s so-called
inconvenience damages are not easily quantifiable and do not
result in real economic loss. These alleged damages are merely an
attempted re-characterization of mental anguish damages. Mental
injury damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention. See [Floyd]. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the ruling of
the district court. 115
4. Morris v. KLM
The House of Lords in the United Kingdom in Morris v. KLM
determined, following the Floyd decision, that “bodily injury” means a
change in some part or parts of the body of a passenger that is sufficiently
serious to be described as an injury.116 A psychiatric illness—emotional

111. Id. at *4.
112. Id. at *5.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. at *4.
115. Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 355 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2004).
116. Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.
[2002] 2 AC (HL) 628.
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upset such as fear, distress, grief, or mental anguish—may be evidence of
bodily injury but does not in itself constitute bodily injury.
The alleged facts of the case were as follows. The plaintiff, Ms.
Morris, a young girl of 15 years, travelled with KLM from Kuala Lumpur
to Amsterdam. She was seated beside two men. After a meal, she fell
asleep and was awakened by the groping hand of the man next to her,
touching her left thigh. He was caressing her between her hip and knee and
his fingers dug into her thigh. 117 Ms. Morris got up, walked away, and
reported the incident to the cabin staff. She became very distressed as a
result of the incident on her return to England. A doctor examined her and
found that she was suffering from clinical depression amounting to a single
episode of a major depressive illness. 118
At the court of first instance, Ms. Morris based her claim for
compensation under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Judge Carter
held in favor of Ms. Morris based on his interpretation of Article 17—that
bodily injury included mental injury—and its applicability to the case at
hand. KLM appealed, arguing that bodily injury in Article 17 was injury
that results in some form of physical damage but does not extend to illness
of the mind.
The Court of Appeal, rejecting Judge Carter’s judgment, held that the
depressive illness suffered by Ms. Morris was not bodily injury within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention on the following grounds:
(1) There is a distinct difference between physical and mental
injury. Physical injury involves damage to the structure of the
body, whereas mental injury affects the well-being of the mind.
(2) The court was bound to interpret Article 17 along the lines of
shared intentions of signatories in 1929. 119
The House of Lords upheld the findings of the Court of Appeal. Their
Lordships examined the traveaux préparatoires of the Warsaw
Convention and found no discussion of the issue of mental injury or
illness. They concluded that Article 17 does not allow one to recover for
emotional damages where he has suffered no physical injury:
Thus, bodily injury simply and unambiguously means a change
in some part or parts of the body of the passenger which is
sufficiently serious to be described as an injury. It does not
include mere emotional upset such as fear, distress, grief or
117. Id. at para. 2.
118. Id. at para. 3.
119. Id. at para. 2.
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mental anguish . . . . A psychiatric illness may often be evidence
of a bodily injury or the description of a condition which includes
bodily injury. But the passenger must be prepared to prove this,
not just prove a psychiatric illness without evidence of its
significance for the existence of a bodily injury. 120
5. Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court considered a passenger’s right
to recover for pure mental injury in Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators
Ltd. 121 Mr. Stott was paralyzed from the shoulders down and a permanent
wheelchair user. 122 When traveling by air, he depended on his wife to
manage his incontinence, help him to eat, and change his sitting
position. 123 Mr. Stott booked flights with Thomas Cook, a tour operator
and air carrier, for he and his wife’s trip to Greece. 124 He telephoned
Thomas Cook’s helpline twice, informing them that he had paid to be
seated with his wife, and he was assured that this would happen. 125
However, on arrival at check-in for the return journey, Mr. and Mrs. Stott
were told that they would not be seated together. 126 They protested but
were eventually told that the seat allocations could not be changed. 127 Mr.
Stott had difficulties boarding the aircraft and was not sufficiently assisted
by Thomas Cook staff. 128 He felt extremely embarrassed, humiliated, and
angry. 129 He was eventually helped into his seat, with his wife sitting
behind him. 130 This arrangement was problematic because Mrs. Stott
could not properly assist her husband during the three-hour-and-twentyminute flight. 131 She had to kneel or crouch in the aisle to attend to his
personal needs, obstructing the cabin crew and other passengers. The cabin
crew made no attempt to ease their difficulties. 132
120. Id. at para. 101–02.
121. Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators LTD, [2014] UKSC 15 (Eng.).
122. Id. at para. 5.
123. Id.
124. Id. at para. 7 (quoting Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators LTD, [2012]
EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.))
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Mr. Stott brought a claim against Thomas Cook seeking damages for
injury to his feelings. 133 Thomas Cook argued that it had made reasonable
efforts and that the Montreal Convention precludes an award of damages
for injury to feelings because under Articles 17 and 29 of the Convention,
damages for harm to passengers can only be awarded in cases of death or
bodily injury. 134 At first instance, the judge decided that the EC Disability
Regulation had in fact been violated and that he would have awarded
₤ 2,500 if the Montreal Convention had not prevented him from doing
so. 135 The court therefore rejected Stott’s claim for aggravated damages
due to injury to his feelings. 136 The Court of Appeal agreed. 137
Mr. Stott appealed to the UK Supreme Court, arguing that his claim
was (1) outside the substantive scope of the Montreal Convention since
the Montreal Convention did not touch the issue of equal access to air
travel, which is governed by the EC Regulations, and (2) outside the
temporal scope of the Montreal Convention because Thomas Cook’s
failure to make all reasonable efforts occurred before Mr. and Mrs. Stott
boarded the aircraft. 138
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. 139 The Court
found that Mr. Stott was treated in a humiliating and disgraceful manner
by Thomas Cook; however, his claim fell within the substantive and
temporal scope of the Montreal Convention and as a result, damages could
not be awarded for injury to feelings:
Substantively, the Convention deals comprehensively with the
carrier’s liability for physical incidents involving passengers
between embarkation and disembarkation. The fact that Mr.
Stott’s claim involves an EU law right makes no difference.
Temporally, Mr. Stott’s claim is for damages and distress suffered
in the course of embarkation and flight, and these fall squarely
within the temporal scope of the Convention. 140

133. Id. at para. 8.
134. Id. at para. 52–53.
135. Id. at para. 8.
136. Id.
137. Id. at para. 9.
138. Id. at para. 45–48.
139. Id. at para. 65.
140. Press Summary, Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators LTD, [2014]
UKSC 15 (Eng.).
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6. Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines
In Australia, the Australian New South Wales Court of Appeal in
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines held, following the Floyd decision, that
the term “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not
include purely psychological injury. 141 On May 28, 1992, the plaintiff,
Kotsambasis, boarded a Singapore Airlines flight in Athens, which was
scheduled to fly to Sydney via Singapore. Shortly after takeoff,
Kotsambasis saw smoke coming out of the starboard engine. The crew
announced that there was an engine problem and that the aircraft would be
returning to Athens but that fuel had to be jettisoned first. The aircraft
landed over an hour after takeoff, and because of the lack of facilities
provided by Athens airport, the passengers were prevented from
disembarking the aircraft for another 2.5 hours. Kotsambasis brought a suit
against Singapore Airlines to recover for damages on the basis of
psychological injuries as well as back injuries. 142
The New South Wales Court of Appeal stated that the two phrases
“bodily injury” and “lésion corporelle” can be regarded as essentially
equivalents and that both are ambiguous as to whether they refer to
psychological injuries:
Both [bodily injury and lésion corporelle] have the same
ambiguity, namely whether the phrase can be taken to refer to a
psychological injury. This ambiguity can only be resolved by
looking at the intention of the contracting parties and adopting a
purposive approach to the interpretation of the Convention. It is
immediately apparent that the adjective “bodily” is a word of
qualification or limitation . . . that courts are not at liberty to
consider any words as superfluous or insignificant . . . . It is clear
that the draftsmen of the Convention did not intend to impose
absolute liability in respect of all forms of injury. 143
The court also reviewed the Floyd decision and entirely agreed with
it. In particular, the court quoted what the Floyd court’s Judge Marshall
wrote regarding the history of negotiations of the Warsaw Convention and
the state of the law in many of the other contracting states at the time: 144
No evidence that the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw
141.
142.
143.
144.

Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines [1997] 42 NSWLR 110 (Austl.).
Id. at 111 E–F.
Id. at 114 E.
Id. at 114 A.
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Convention specifically considered liability for psychic or the
meaning of lésion corporelle . . . . Indeed, the unavailability of
compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and civil
law countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference persuades us
that the signatories had no specific intent to include such a remedy
in the convention.
The court concluded that the term “bodily injury” was not intended to and,
on a proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, does not include
purely psychological injury. 145
B. Recovery Allowed Only for Emotional Distress Flowing from Bodily
Injury
Under the second approach, emotional distress flowing from a bodily
injury is a recoverable element of damages allowed for the bodily injury.
Thus, damages are allowed for emotional distress only to the extent that
the emotional distress is caused by a bodily injury. 146 An injured passenger
may, therefore, recover for physical injuries, e.g., a twisted ankle, as well
as for his emotional distress related to the twisted ankle, but not for
emotional distress generally related to the accident.
1. Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
In Jack, a TWA flight departing JFK Airport for San Francisco
experienced an aborted takeoff.147 During the aborted takeoff and
evacuation, some passengers suffered minor physical injuries, and many
alleged emotional distress caused by the incident. 148 The passengers filed
several lawsuits seeking damages for physical injury and emotional
distress. 149 TWA moved for partial summary judgment under the Warsaw
Convention. 150 TWA argued that the passengers suffering impact injuries
were barred from any emotional distress recovery unless the emotional
145. Id. at 115 F.
146. Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98-1027, 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 1999); Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Longo v. Air France, No. 95-0292, 1996 WL 866124 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (no
recovery for fear of death in runway overrun case even though passenger suffered
minor injury in evacuating aircraft—stepped on a sea urchin).
147. Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 654.
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id. at 657.
150. Id.
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distress itself had resulted in physical manifestations. 151 The district court
agreed with TWA’s contention and held that a carrier is not liable under
Article 17 for pure mental injuries. 152 The district court examined, in
considerable detail, the application of the Floyd case to the facts and
analyzed four possible different approaches to determining the
recoverability of emotional distress damages. 153 The court ultimately
adopted the fourth approach, which: (1) limited recovery of emotional
distress damages to distress flowing from the plaintiff’s impact injuries;
(2) denied emotional distress recoveries to plaintiffs who had neither
suffered impact injuries nor physical manifestations of their emotional
distress from the accident; and (3) limited plaintiffs who had suffered
physical manifestations of their emotional distress to damages flowing
from those physical manifestations, and not from the accident in
general. 154 The court stated that
damages for emotional distress are allowed only for distress that
flows from a bodily injury, reasoning that it would prevent
inequities among the passengers, in that the happenstance of
getting scratched on the way down the evacuation slide [did] not
enable one passenger to obtain a substantially greater recovery
than that of an unscratched co-passenger who was equally terrified
by the plane crash . . . . Under this approach, a plaintiff can recover
for emotional distress caused by and flowing from a physical
injury, but not for the emotional distress caused by and flowing
from the accident itself. 155

151. Id.
152. Id. at 668.
153. Id. at 665.
154. Id. at 668.
155. Id. In Longo v. Air France, No. 95-0292, 1996 WL 866124, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996), a honeymooning couple sustained minor injuries while
using emergency slides after their aircraft slid off the runway into the ocean. The
wife bruised her thigh and stepped on a sea urchin; the husband bruised his knee.
They claimed they could recover for all their mental distress as long as some
physical injury had also occurred. Rejecting that claim, the district court reasoned
that the only compensable mental injury was that springing from physical injury:
Although Floyd left open the question of whether emotional distress is
compensable under Article 17 if accompanied by bodily injury, Floyd
prescribes the decision here to the extent the Longos have alleged mental
injury that although accompanied by physical injury is unrelated to that
physical injury. Allegations of mental distress that is unrelated to
physical injury—i.e., mental distress that does not flow from physical
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2. Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Alvarez, the plaintiff traveled from New York to Santo Domingo
on American Airlines Flight 587. 156 Shortly after the plane left the gate, it
stopped. 157 Approximately two minutes later, “a strong gas smell”
suffused the passenger cabin, and the plane filled rapidly with smoke. 158
A member of the flight crew yelled “get out,” and the passengers,
including Alvarez, scrambled for the exits. 159 When Alvarez reached the
exit door, the plane’s emergency slide had already inflated. 160 Alvarez
jumped onto the slide and descended in a sitting position. 161 Before
reaching the ground, a second evacuating passenger bumped Alvarez from
behind. 162 As a result of this collision, Alvarez picked up speed and, near
the bottom of the slide, bumped into a third passenger. 163 Alvarez’s heels
struck the ground, and he fell forward onto his knees, then backward onto
his buttocks. 164 Alvarez came to rest on the runway, three feet from the
end of the slide. 165 As a result of Alvarez’s impact with the runway, he felt
a burning sensation on his knees and buttocks and was bruised in both
places. 166 One month after the accident, Alvarez began to experience
nightmares and anxiety attacks. 167 Alvarez sued American Airlines for
injuries suffered, claiming both physical and psychic injuries. 168 The
airline moved for summary judgment dismissing all psychologically based
injuries. 169
The district court first addressed the issue of Alvarez’s physical
injuries and concluded that they were recoverable under Article 17
because the requirement of proximate causation was satisfied:
160F

16F

162F

163F

164F

165F

16F

167F

168F

injury or that does not flow from the physical manifestations of mental
distress—are no different from the pure mental injury claims proscribed
by Floyd, and therefore must be dismissed.
156. Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98-1027, 1999 WL 691922, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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With respect to plaintiff’s claims of physical injury, all three
conditions [of the air carrier’s liability under Article 17] have been
met. First, the parties have stipulated that there was an “accident.”
Second, the bruises, scrapes, and other physical injuries allegedly
suffered by Alvarez during the evacuation constitute “bodily
injury.” Third, Alvarez was injured while evacuating—“in the
course of . . . disembarking.” Therefore, Alvarez may recover
under Article 17 for physical injuries proximately caused by the
evacuation of Flight 587. 170
The district court then turned to Alvarez’s claim for psychological
injuries. The court held that Alvarez could not recover damages for
psychological injuries because his psychological injuries resulted from his
reaction to the terror of the accident and not from his knee injury.171 The
court rejected Alvarez’s argument that Article 17 only requires a physical
injury or death as a condition to liability and that once that condition is
met, Article 17 allows recovery for all damage sustained in the accident,
whether physical or psychological, for three reasons: 172 (1) the
preservation of the substantive decision in Floyd, 173 (2) consistency of the
Second Circuit Article 17 jurisprudence, 174 and (3) protection against
“illogical results.” 175 Regarding the first reason, the court said:
[The majority rule adopted by] most courts . . . permitted plaintiffs
to recover for psychological injuries only if there is a causal link
between the alleged physical injury and the alleged psychological
injury. I find the majority rule more compelling. First, adoption of
the contrary, minority rule [which permits recovery for
psychological injuries provided only that there are some, even
unrelated, physical injuries as well] would tend to undermine the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Floyd . . . . [T]he Supreme
Court held in Floyd that Article 17 does not permit recovery for
strictly psychological injuries. If the minority rule were adopted,
plaintiffs would be able to skirt Floyd’s bar on recovery, for purely
psychological injuries simply by alleging that they have suffered
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id. at *5.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *5. The court, quoting from the Jack opinion, expressed its fear that
“passengers [may be] treated differently from one another on the basis of an
arbitrary and insignificant difference in their [physical] experience.” Id. (citing
Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 664, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
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some physical injury, no matter how slight or remote. As a
practical matter, the substantive rule law announced in Floyd
would thus be converted into an easily satisfied pleading
formality, and a back door would be impermissibly opened to
recovery for purely psychological injuries. 176
3. Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Ehrlich, the plaintiffs, Gary and Maryanne Ehrlich, boarded an
American Eagle flight in Baltimore, Maryland.177 They intended to travel
to JFK, where they were scheduled to connect to an American Airlines
flight to London. 178 When their flight reached JFK, the plane approached
the airport at a high rate of speed, overshot its designated runway, and was
abruptly stopped from potentially plunging into Thurston Bay by an
arrestor bed. 179 The passengers subsequently evacuated that aircraft by
jumping approximately six to eight feet to the ground. 180 As a result of the
landing and evacuation, both plaintiffs claimed to have suffered physical
injuries. 181 Specifically, Gary Ehrlich claimed to have sustained soft tissue
injuries to both of his knees and Maryanne Ehrlich claimed to have
sustained soft tissue injuries to her upper extremities, right knee, back,
shoulder, and hips, as well as hypertension and cardiac changes.182 In
addition to their physical injuries, the plaintiffs claimed that they had
suffered mental injuries consisting of nightmares and a fear of flying as a
result of the accident. 183
The plaintiffs, however, admitted that the mental injuries they claimed
were not related to or caused by the physical injuries they sustained in the
accident. 184 The plaintiffs’ mental injuries were a result of the fear that
they experienced during the accident. American Airlines moved for partial
summary judgment on the mental injury claims, arguing that they did not
flow from bodily injuries and that carriers were liable under the Warsaw
Convention only for psychological injuries that were caused by bodily
injuries. 185 In other words, the back and knee injuries did not cause the
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at *3–4 (internal citations omitted).
Erlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id.
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plaintiffs’ nightmares, hypertension, and fear of flying. Instead, because
these mental injuries resulted from the near-death crash, they were not
cognizable. The Ehrlichs contended that carriers could be liable under
Warsaw if a mental injury accompanied a physical injury, irrespective of
whether it was the bruised back or the crash-landing that gave rise to the
imminent fear of death. 186
On reviewing the applicable case law, the district court determined
that “[u]nder the Warsaw Convention, a plaintiff may only recover for
emotional damages caused by physical injuries.” 187 Because the Ehrlichs
had not raised a genuine issue regarding a causal connection between their
alleged bodily injuries and their mental suffering, the court dismissed their
claim for psychological injuries, holding that plaintiffs may “not recover
for their emotional trauma resulting solely from the aberrant landing and
evacuation.” 188 The Ehrlichs appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
district court and held that the airline was not liable under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, for mental injuries not caused by bodily injury. 189 In
reaching its decision, the court extensively reviewed the French text of the
Warsaw Convention, the negotiations that led to the adoption of the
Convention, the purpose of the Convention, French law, the opinions
(judicial and otherwise) of the United States’ sister convention signatories
at the recent Montreal Convention, and the meaning attributed to Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention by the executive branch of the United
States:
To address the issue presented by this appeal, we must reach the
question left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Floyd. We need
to construe the Warsaw Convention and determine whether
carriers may be held liable under Article 17 for mental injuries that
accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries. In the
proceedings below . . . the district court [has not] addressed the
meaning of the language of Article 17 with sufficient specificity.
However, after reviewing that provision in accordance with the
proper canons of treaty interpretation, we conclude . . . that Article
17 allows passengers to bring a Warsaw Convention action against
air carriers to recover for their mental injuries but only to the

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 374.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
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extent that they flow from bodily injuries.190
The court specifically rejected the notion that emotional distress injuries
that flow from an accident or that manifest in physical injuries constitute
a bodily injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:
The happenstance of getting scratched on the way down the
evacuation slide [should] not enable one passenger to obtain a
substantially greater recovery than that of an unscratched copassenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash. . . . If we
determined that a “physical injury, no matter how minor or
unrelated,” could “trigger recovery of any and all post-crash
mental injuries,” that conclusion would violate the “spirit of
Floyd.” 191
It is worth pointing out that although the accident in Ehrlich occurred
before the United States ratified the Montreal Convention, leaving the
Warsaw Convention as the governing authority, the court took great pains
to address whether and how the Montreal Convention might apply. 192 The
court, having discussed at length the Montreal Conference Minutes and
the statements expressed by the Conference delegates, concluded that the
Montreal Convention did not change the existing jurisprudence on what
was or was not included in the term “bodily injury”:
In essence, despite the Ehrlichs' suggestions to the contrary, the
history of the negotiations that produced the Montreal Convention
demonstrate that the Montreal Conference delegates did not share
a common understanding when it came to the subject of liability
for mental injuries.
. . .
[T]hese delegates appear to suggest that their nations might
construe Article 17 as if it allowed a passenger to hold a carrier
liable for a mental injury, irrespective of whether it accompanied
a physical injury, because they interpret the words “lésion
corporelle” . . . to refer both to physical and mental injuries.
However, whatever deference we may sometimes owe to the
opinions of sister signatories, we may not defer to such an
understanding of Article 17. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that “lésion corporelle” refers to bodily injuries
190. Id. at 375–76.
191. Id. at 386 (quoting Erlich v. Am. Airlines, No. 99-6013, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21419 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2002)).
192. Id. at 372–73.
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alone and that an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17
for purely mental injuries. We are bound to follow such precedent
unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules Floyd. In the
absence of a statement from these delegates that could be
construed to define the scope of the Warsaw Convention through
something more than a contradictory interpretation of the words
“lésion corporelle,” the opinions of such delegates at the Montreal
Conference are of little relevance to the issue before us. 193
The court described the U.S. delegate’s statement of the law under the
jurisprudence of the United States—that the term “bodily injury” had been
interpreted as including “mental injury that accompanied or was
associated with bodily injury”—as incorrect and rejected it as an
unreasonable view:
The Ehrlichs contend that the American delegate’s statements
support their construction of Article 17 and argue that we must
defer to the delegate's so-called “interpretation” of that provision.
. . .
At the Conference, the American delegate opined that references
to mental injuries “resulting from” bodily injuries “might”
represent a “step backwards” because “[t]he general prevailing
attitude in [c]ourts interpreting the Warsaw Convention in the
United States was that mental injury associated with bodily injury
had generally been recoverable.” . . . By making these statements,
the American delegate appeared to suggest that, as of May 1999,
the majority of courts in the United States construed Article 17 in
a fashion that allowed passengers to recover for a mental injury
whenever they sustained a physical injury, regardless of whether
the mental injury resulted from a bodily injury. That
understanding of applicable case law is incorrect. 194
193. Id. at 395 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
194. Id. at 398–99 (internal citations omitted). The few courts that have
addressed bodily injury under the Montreal Convention have forgone an
independent study of the delegates’ negotiations, instead relying on Ehrlich as
well as other Warsaw precedent as authority for the old rule—a claimant can
recover for mental injury only if it results from bodily injury. See, e.g., Kruger v.
United Airlines, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing
Ehrlich as authority for the history and enactment of the Montreal Convention; in
the case, claimant was struck in head by backpack swung by another passenger,
and the court held that “plaintiffs may not recover for any emotional distress
experienced during the flight, except as [claimant’s] distress arose out of her
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C. Allow Recovery for All Emotional Distress, so Long as Bodily Injury
Occurs
Under the third approach, recovery is allowed for all emotional
distress as long as a bodily injury occurs, even if there is no connection
between the distress and the bodily injury. 195 Thus, a passenger with a
scratched arm could recover for the trauma and fear due to the plane crash;
the bodily injury opens the door to liability for emotional distress. 196
1. Chendrimada v. Air-India
In Chendrimada, the plaintiffs brought an action for injuries that
occurred on a trip to Bombay, India. 197 The plaintiffs’ first flight from New
York was canceled due to a bomb scare, and the plaintiffs were
rescheduled on a flight the following day. 198 The flight made a scheduled
stop in Delhi, but due to weather conditions, the flight remained in Delhi
for eleven and a half hours, during which the plaintiffs were not allowed
to deplane, nor were they provided with any food.199 The plaintiffs claimed
that as a result they suffered from weakness, nausea, cramps, pain,
anguish, malnutrition, and mental injury. 200 Air-India moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claim amounted to nothing more than
emotional distress injuries that were not compensable under Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention. 201
In denying the summary judgment motion, the district court found that
the plaintiffs’ allegations of bodily injury satisfied the requirements of
Floyd to survive summary judgment—namely that they alleged a
injuries”); Booker v. BWIA W. Indies Airways Ltd., No. 06-2146, 2007 WL
1351927, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007) (citing Ehrlich for its conclusion that
claimant’s emotional injuries stemming from delayed baggage “are not
recoverable under the Montreal Convention unless they were caused by physical
injuries”); Sobol v. Cont’l Airlines, No. 05-8992, 2006 WL 2742051, at *1, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (citing Ehrlich for its conclusion that in order to
recover, a claimant’s mental injuries arising from enforced separation from his
children in the first-class cabin “must be caused by bodily injury, which is not the
case here”).
195. Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 665 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
196. Id.
197. Chendrimada v. Air-India, 802 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
198. Id. at 1090.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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“physical injury or manifestation of physical injury.” 202 The court
concluded that, if believed, these injuries were sufficient to constitute an
injury and that the delay and alleged refusal to allow the plaintiffs to leave
the aircraft could constitute an accident, as it was unexpected and external
to the passengers. 203 The manifestation of physical injury need not result
from a suddenly inflicted trauma but may, as is alleged here, result from
other causes for which the carrier is responsible:
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in the Floyd case that
a passenger cannot recover for purely emotional or mental injuries
absent physical injury or manifestation of physical injury.
Therefore, to survive Floyd, plaintiffs must allege a physical
injury or a manifestation of physical injury. The Court finds that
plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy this requirement. It should be
understood that the Court is not ruling that as a matter of law being
held on an airplane for over eleven hours without food is a
physical injury in and of itself. If a passenger in the same position
as plaintiffs had not exhibited any physical manifestation of injury
as a result of being held without food, but only alleged emotional
injury, no action would lie. Of course, plaintiffs must still prove
their alleged physical injuries at trial to recover, but plaintiffs have
demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact in
dispute which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary
judgment. In reaching this conclusion we of course have
determined that the “manifestation of physical injury” which is a
prerequisite to an action under Floyd need not result from a
suddenly inflicted trauma, but may, as is alleged here, result from
other causes for which the carrier is responsible. 204
2. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois allowed recovery for mental injuries
that arose prior to or simultaneously with bodily injury. 205 In that case, 68
202. Id. at 1092.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, No. 95C7670, 1998 WL 111652, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1998) (compensable bodily injury need not be based on
physical impact but may arise after a delay that leads to such physical
manifestations of injury as nausea and diarrhea).
205. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 954 F.
Supp. 175, 176 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

1174

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

persons on board died when an American Eagle flight crashed. 206 The
dispute focused on whether pre-impact fear and terror were properly
characterized as purely mental injuries, thereby barring recovery under
Floyd. 207 The airline argued that the Warsaw Convention prohibits
recovery for pre-impact fear, contending that pre-impact fear is a purely
psychic injury and that the recovery of damages for such injuries is
foreclosed by Floyd. 208 The plaintiffs responded that the psychic injuries
were accompanied by physical injuries, including the deaths of all
passengers, and noted that the Court in Floyd specifically declined to
consider the situation in which both types of injury were present. 209 The
plaintiffs contended that “neither Floyd nor any other binding authority
requires the dismissal of their claims alleging preimpact fear.” 210 The
district court agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that Floyd’s holding merely
made physical injury a precondition to liability and that once that
precondition was met, there was nothing in Floyd stating that damages
were unavailable for mental injuries.211 The Roselawn court determined
that a causal connection is only required between the damage sustained
and the accident, thus dispensing with the necessity for a causal connection
between the physical injury and the emotional injury:
Second, the Court in Floyd did not hold that there could never be
any recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article 17.
. . .
Article 17 itself expressly requires a causal link only between
“damage sustained” and the accident . . . . Article 17 does not say
that a carrier will only be liable for damage caused by a bodily
injury, or that passengers can only recover for mental injuries if
they are caused by bodily injuries. No less an authority than our
Supreme Court has indicated that the key causal link is between
the accident and the damage sustained. 212
As a result, the court permitted recovery for pre-impact terror. 213
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.at 178.
212. Id. at 178–79.
213. Id. In Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, the court awarded
damages for emotional injury that was accompanied by, but not caused by,
simultaneous physical injury. 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993). When a Soviet
missile shot down an international flight, claimants sought damages for pre-death
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3. Doe v. Etihad Airways
In Doe v. Etihad Airways, the plaintiff, Doe, was returning from Abu
Dhabi to Chicago aboard a flight operated by Etihad Airways. 214 After
reaching inside the seatback pocket in front of her, she pricked her finger
on a hypodermic needle that was hidden in the pocket, causing it to
bleed. 215 Doe was given a Band-Aid for her finger and was tested multiple
times for possible exposure to disease, each time testing negative. 216 Doe
sued Etihad, claiming damages both for the physical injury—the needle
prick—and for mental injury—the distress associated with the possible
exposure to various diseases. 217 Her husband, John Doe, claimed loss of
consortium. 218 The district court granted partial summary judgment in
Etihad’s favor, holding that Doe’s emotional distress was not caused by
the bodily injury sustained by the needle, and therefore, the injury was not
compensable under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. 219
On appeal, Etihad argued that the plaintiff could only recover for
mental anguish under the Montreal Convention if the mental anguish was
caused by the bodily injury, i.e., being stuck by the needle. 220 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order, holding that
under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, emotional or mental
damages are recoverable “so long as they are traceable to the accident,
regardless of whether they are caused directly by the bodily injury.” 221 The
court held that because Doe’s alleged mental distress arose from the
accident itself, i.e., pricking her finger on the needle, she could recover for
emotional distress damages, even if the mental distress was unrelated to
the nominal physical injury she received:
pain and suffering. The court found that passengers were alive and conscious for
about 11 minutes after the initial missile strike. Acknowledging that under Floyd,
damages for mental anguish were not recoverable “absent physical injury,” the
court awarded damages for the decedents’ mental anguish because the evidence
showed that they sustained physical injury due to rapid air decompression.
According to the court, the fact that the emotional injury was accompanied by
physical injury and that the decedents’ suffering was likely considerable made the
case “vastly different” from Floyd.
214. Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 409 (6th Cir. 2017).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., No. 13-14358, 2015 WL 5936326, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2015).
220. Doe, 870 F.3d at 433
221. Id.
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[B]ecause an accident onboard Etihad’s aircraft caused Doe to
suffer a bodily injury . . . Doe may therefore recover damages for
her mental anguish, regardless of whether that anguish was caused
directly by her bodily injury or more generally by the accident that
caused the bodily injury . . . [T]he plain text of Article 17(1) allows
our conclusion that when a single “accident” causes both bodily
injury and mental anguish, that mental anguish is sustained “in
case of” the bodily injury. But the plain text on its own does not
necessarily require that a single accident cause both the required
bodily injury and the claimed mental anguish in order for that
mental anguish to be “sustained in case of” the bodily injury, as
our conclusion suggests. 222
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Etihad represents a radical expansion
for an air carrier’s potential liability under the Montreal Convention. 223
Under the Warsaw Convention, as indicated above, an air carrier’s liability
for emotional damages was limited to damages resulting from a bodily
injury, and a passenger could not recover for emotional damages
unconnected with the actual injury. Under the Montreal Convention and
according to the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the air carrier would be liable for
emotional damages unconnected with the bodily injury. The Sixth Circuit
declined to adopt the Ehrlich holding (i.e., a plaintiff can only recover for
emotional damages if they were caused by a bodily injury) 224 as a means
to interpret the Montreal Convention. The court noted the differing
purposes of the Warsaw and Montreal conventions. 225 For instance, the
Warsaw Convention was adopted in 1929 to limit the liability of airlines
“in order to foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation
industry,” 226 while the Montreal Convention was adopted in 1999 to offer
a “modernized uniform liability regime for international air
transportation.” 227 Given the dramatically different rationales for each

222. Id. at 417–18
223. David Krueger, How Should Air Carriers Respond to Etihad?, LAW360
(Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.beneschlaw.com/Files/Publication/2fc34939-80e949bd-a22c-bd0a4529bff2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c356a5d9-c6a74112-b225-c117cd858e83/Krueger_Law360.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5P5-3DS8].
224. Doe, 870 F.3d at 415 (citing Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366,
369 (2d Cir. 2004)).
225. Id. at 426.
226. Id. at 416, 420.
227. Id. at 423.
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treaty, the court found Ehrlich of limited use in interpreting the actual text
of the Montreal Convention. 228
The court instead relied on its own textual interpretation of Article 17
to find that although a passenger may not recover mental anguish damages
absent an accident that causes bodily injury, there is no requirement that
the mental anguish be caused by the bodily injury itself. 229 The court’s
interpretation hinged upon its understanding of the phrase “in case of” in
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. While Etihad likened the phrase to
“caused by,” the court determined that its meaning was conditional rather
than causal. 230 In other words, a passenger need not establish that her
emotional damages were caused by “death or bodily injury.” The
passenger need only show that she suffered emotional damages as a result
of an accident that also happened to cause a bodily injury. 231 Accordingly,
the court held that as long as there is an accident that causes a bodily injury,
mental anguish damages are recoverable even if the mental anguish does
not flow from the bodily injury itself. 232
CONCLUSION
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Convention states
that the carrier is liable for the passenger’s damages sustained in a case of
death or bodily injury. There is nothing given in the conventions to clarify
whether the term “bodily injury” includes both physical and emotional
injuries. Therefore, common law courts have attempted to find an answer
to the question and adopted the following three approaches:
(1) disallow recovery for pure emotional distress;
(2) allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a
bodily injury; and
(3) allow recovery for all emotional distress, so long as bodily
injury occurs.
Under the first approach, the common law courts agreed that a purely
mental injury suffered in an accident where there is no physical injury is
not a compensable injury. This was first concluded by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the seminal case Floyd, which has been followed in the United
Kingdom and Australia. The first approach is in accordance with the
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 417–18.
Id.
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primary purpose of the Warsaw Convention, which is the limitation of air
carriers’ liability in order to foster the growth of the infant aviation
industry; allowing recovery for psychic injuries would upset this purpose.
This first approach is undesirable because it gives so little to the
passengers. By disallowing compensation for emotional distress,
passengers will only recover pecuniary losses, providing minimal
compensation for passengers who have suffered mental injury. 233 In a
footnote, the Ninth Circuit proposed a troubling hypothetical: suppose “a
flight attendant . . . puts an unloaded gun to a passenger’s head and pulls
the trigger.” 234 Or what if a flight attendant molests an unaccompanied
minor without leaving any bruises or scrapes? Can the crew defame or
slander a plaintiff without fear of liability? The Ninth Circuit conceded
that “[t]o the extent such plaintiffs are left without a remedy, no matter
how egregious the airline’s conduct, that is a result of the deal struck
among the signatories to the Warsaw Convention.” 235
Another argument against this position is that Article 17 only
establishes the conditions for air carrier liability and does not impose any
further restrictions on the types of damages that may be recovered. 236 A
close study of the 1999 Montreal Convention’s history and more
importantly, the negotiations among the signatories’ delegates suggests
that the great majority of signatories intended to broaden the allowable
recovery beyond strictly bodily injury and that many signatories had
already interpreted the phrase to include mental injury. As a result, courts
interpreting “bodily injury” under the Montreal Convention should closely
review the intent of the signatories before adopting the Warsaw
Convention’s precedent.
The second approach allows damages for emotional distress only to
the extent the emotional distress is caused by bodily injury. An injured
passenger may therefore recover for physical injuries, i.e., a twisted ankle,
as well as for his emotional distress related to the twisted ankle, but not
for emotional distress related to the accident as such. The second approach
allows for greater recovery with more severe injuries, presuming that more
distress flows from more serious injuries.
There seems to be some uniformity between common law courts in
that they have unanimously approved recovery for the mental injury
flowing from physical injury. If the mental injury is caused by a physical

233.
234.
235.
236.

Boulee, supra note 88, at 514.
Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1053 n.47 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Sisk, supra note 14, at 134.
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injury, which in turn was caused by the accident, the damages stemming
from the mental injury are recoverable.
The second approach, however, spawned aberrant results. For
example, a passenger assaulted by an airline employee could recover for a
scratch on the arm but not for psychological damages stemming from
molestation, unless the passenger could prove that his mental injuries
derived from the scratch rather than the assault. As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated, passengers who suffered psychological injuries that did
not flow from physical injuries had no recourse: “To the extent that such
plaintiffs are left without a remedy, no matter how egregious the airline’s
conduct.” 237
The third approach allows recovery for all emotional distress, as long
as bodily injury occurs, regardless of the connection between the distress
and the bodily injury. Assume, for example, that a crash landing occurs.
In the process, a passenger pinches his finger in the tray table of his seat
but is otherwise unharmed. The passenger then sues the carrier both for
his physical injury (the pinched finger) and emotional distress—claiming
the crash landing has led to a fear of flying. Under the first and second
approaches, the passenger could only recover damages, if any, for his
pinched finger and any emotional damages resulting from his pinched
finger. But the passenger could not recover emotional damages for the new
supposed fear of flight, which was the result of the crash landing and
unconnected to the bodily injury. However, under the third approach the
passenger could recover damages even though the emotional damages
were unconnected to the bodily injury.
The third approach is consistent with a broad reading of Article 17’s
imposition of liability for “damage sustained in the event of . . . bodily
injury.” 238 Significantly, the drafters did not use the phrase “damage
caused by . . . bodily injury,” which would have served as a signal that any
mental distress must be connected to the bodily injury. 239 The third
approach also is supported by the Floyd Court’s careful avoidance of any
mention of a need for a causal connection between the bodily injury and
the damages recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. This approach is
in line with the approach to mental distress taken in several cases where a
physical impact or manifestation was a prerequisite to recovery. 240
An analysis of the three approaches reveals that the third one—to
allow recovery for emotional distress as long as bodily injury occurs—is
237.
238.
1994).
239.
240.

Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 666 (N.D. Cal.
Id.
Id. at 665.
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the most appropriate. Although the 1999 Montreal Convention retained
the “bodily injury” language, a close study of the treaty’s history and more
importantly, the negotiations among the signatories’ delegates suggests
that the great majority of signatories intended to broaden the allowable
recovery beyond strictly bodily injury and that many signatories had
already interpreted the phrase to include mental injury. Furthermore, the
policy informing the new treaty substantively changed from protecting the
airline industry to protecting the passenger. The Preamble to the 1999
Montreal Convention clearly emphasizes the changed outlook from the
1929 Warsaw Convention where the purpose was the protection of infant
air carriers in an experimental industry. Seventy years later the purpose
has become the protection of the consuming public in a worldwide
industry that has become essential to the welfare of the global
community. 241
The preamble is a strong suggestion of the spirit in which national
courts are to interpret the provisions of the carrier’s liability under the
Montreal Convention. This should produce a more uniform interpretation
of the treaty language than that which occurred in the last years of the
Warsaw Convention.

241. The preamble notes, in part: “RECOGNIZING the importance of
ensuring protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air
and the need for RECOGNIZING the importance of ensuring protection of the
interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable
compensation based on the principle of restitution,” see Montreal Convention,
supra note 2.

